Habitual Desire: On Kant’s Concept of Inclination

Kantian Review 21 (2):211-235 (2016)

Authors
Eric Wilson
Georgia State University
Abstract
Tamar Schapiro has offered an important new ‘Kantian’ account of inclination and motivation, one that expands and refines Christine Korsgaard’s view. In this article I argue that Kant’s own view differs significantly from Schapiro’s. Above all, Kant thinks of inclinations as dispositions, not occurrent desires; and he does not believe that they stem directly from a non-rational source, as she argues. Schapiro’s ‘Kantian’ view rests on a much sharper distinction between the rational and non-rational parts of the soul. In the process of explaining these differences, I argue that Kant’s own view is in some respects philosophically superior to Schapiro’s. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.Habitual Desire: On Kant’s Concept of InclinationVolume 21, Issue 2Eric Entrican Wilson DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415416000030Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle email.@free.kindle.com@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. Habitual Desire: On Kant’s Concept of InclinationVolume 21, Issue 2Eric Entrican Wilson DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415416000030Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. Habitual Desire: On Kant’s Concept of InclinationVolume 21, Issue 2Eric Entrican Wilson DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415416000030Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation.
Keywords desire   moral psychology   passion  inclination
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DOI 10.1017/s1369415416000030
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
How to Speak of the Colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
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Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality.Eric Watkins - 2005 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 68 (3):624-626.

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Citations of this work BETA

Beyond Words: Inarticulable Reasons and Reasonable Commitments.Kyla Ebels‐Duggan - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):623-641.

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