Horgan on vagueness

Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):273-285 (2002)
The paper is a critique of Terry Horgan's transvaluationist theory of vagueness. It argues that Horgan's formulations equivocate between a semantic 'ought' and a semantic 'is'. On one reading, transvaluationism is trivially inconsistent. On another reading, it is consistent, but also consistent with an epistemic account of vagueness. In addition, the paper criticizes Horgan's attempt to recruit supervaluationism as a form of transvaluationism and his argument against vagueness in the world.
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