How superduper does a physicalist supervenience need to be?

Philosophical Quarterly 49 (194):33-52 (1999)
Authors
Jessica Wilson
University of Missouri, St. Louis
Abstract
Note: this is the first published presentation and defense of the 'proper subset strategy' for making sense of non-reductive physicalism or the associated notion of realization; this is sometimes, inaccurately, called "Shoemaker's subset strategy"; if people could either call it the 'subset strategy' or better yet, add my name to the mix I would appreciate it. Horgan claims that physicalism requires "superdupervenience" -- supervenience plus robust ontological explanation of the supervenient in terms of the base properties. I argue that Horgan's account fails to rule out physically unacceptable emergence. I rather suggest that this and other unacceptable possibilities may be ruled out by requiring that each individual causal power in the set associated with a given supervenient property be numerically identical with a causal power in the set associated with its base property. I go on to show that a wide variety of physicalist accounts, both reductive and non-reductive, are implicitly or explicitly designed to meet this condition, and so are more similar than they seem. In particular, non-reductive physicalism accounts typically appeal to a relation plausibly ensuring that the powers of a higher-level property are a proper subset of those of its physical base property.
Keywords proper subset strategy  subset account of realization  mental causation  non-reductive physicalism  supervenience  mental causation  Kim, J  realization  subset of powers  powers-based realization
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00127
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References found in this work BETA

Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
Mental Causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
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Citations of this work BETA

No Work for a Theory of Grounding.Jessica Wilson - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):535–579.
Grounding and the Argument From Explanatoriness.David Mark Kovacs - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):2927-2952.
Realization Relations in Metaphysics.Umut Baysan - 2015 - Minds and Machines (3):1-14.

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