In Defence of Objective Bayesianism

Oxford University Press (2010)
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Abstract

Objective Bayesianism is a methodological theory that is currently applied in statistics, philosophy, artificial intelligence, physics and other sciences. This book develops the formal and philosophical foundations of the theory, at a level accessible to a graduate student with some familiarity with mathematical notation.

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Jon Williamson
University of Kent

Citations of this work

An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.
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Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.
The structure of epistemic probabilities.Nevin Climenhaga - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3213-3242.

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