Authors
Elliott Sober
University of Wisconsin, Madison
William Roche
Texas Christian University
Abstract
We argued that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant in the following sense: Let H be a hypothesis, O an observation, and E the proposition that H would explain O if H and O were true. Then our claim is that Pr = Pr. We defended this screening-off thesis by discussing an example concerning smoking and cancer. Climenhaga argues that SOT is mistaken because it delivers the wrong verdict about a slightly different smoking-and-cancer case. He also considers a variant of SOT, called “SOT*”, and contends that it too gives the wrong result. We here reply to Climenhaga’s arguments and suggest that SOT provides a criticism of the widely held theory of inference called “inference to the best explanation”.
Keywords Bayesianism  Climenhaga  Confirmation  Explanatoriness  Inference to the best explanation  Screening-off
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DOI 10.1007/s10838-016-9357-5
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References found in this work BETA

Ockham’s Razors: A User’s Manual.Elliott Sober - 2015 - Cambridge University Press.
Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):421-423.
How Explanation Guides Confirmation.Nevin Climenhaga - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (2):359-68.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Perils of Parsimony.William Roche - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (9):485-505.

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