Inexact knowledge

Mind 101 (402):217-242 (1992)
Abstract
Most of our knowledge is inexact, and known by us to be so. An example of such known inexactness will be described in some detail. The description seems to entail a contradiction. However, the paradoxical reasoning rests on an assumption. It will be suggested that the description is correct and this assumption false. Its failure will be explained by means of a picture of inexact knowledge in which the notion of a margin for error is central. This picture suggests diagnoses of other paradoxical arguments: Surprise Examinations, backwards inductions about Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, and the Heap
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DOI 10.1093/mind/101.402.217
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Contrastive Knowledge.Antti Karjalainen & Adam Morton - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):74 – 89.
The Problem of Rational Knowledge.Mark Jago - 2013 - Erkenntnis (S6):1-18.
A Taxonomy of Errors for Information Systems.Giuseppe Primiero - 2014 - Minds and Machines 24 (3):249-273.
Higher-Order Sorites Paradox.Elia Zardini - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):25-48.
Inexact Knowledge with Introspection.Denis Bonnay & Paul Égré - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (2):179-227.

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