Abstract
The paper challenges the inferentialist account of concept possession that Paul Boghossian takes as a premise in his account of the transmission of justification by deductive reasoning in his paper 'Blind Reasoning'. Unorthodox speakers who reject the inferences in an alleged possession condition can still have the concept by understanding a word for it. In that sense, the inferences are not analytic. Inferentialist accounts of logical constants, theoretical terms (using the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis method) and pejorative expressions such as 'Boche' are examined and rejected. It is suggested that epistemological questions cannot be reduced to questions in the theory of thought and meaning
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-8349.00111
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,018
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Could Evolution Explain Our Reliability About Logic?Joshua Schechter - 2013 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4. pp. 214.
The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic.Joshua Schechter - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):437-464.

View all 76 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Understanding and Semantic Structure: Reply to Timothy Williamson.Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):337-343.
Modality & Other Matters: An Interview with Timothy Williamson.Timothy Williamson & Paal Antonsen - 2010 - Perspectives: International Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):16-29.
Inferential Evidence.Jeffrey Dunn - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (3):203-213.
Is Timothy Williamson a Necessary Existent?David Efird - 2010 - In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Assertion, Denial and Some Cancellation Rules in Modal Logic.Timothy Williamson - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (3):299--318.
Williamson’s Argument Against the KK-Principle 157.Murali Ramachandran - 2005 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 1.
Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic Reply.Timothy Williamson - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):498-506.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
394 ( #15,973 of 2,324,058 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
21 ( #31,930 of 2,324,058 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes