In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter. pp. 597-608 (2013)

Paula Satne
University of Wolverhampton
Motivational internalism is roughly the view that moral judgement necessarily involves some degree of motivation to act morally. Kantian and non-Kantian scholars in general agree that Kant is committed to motivational internalism. However, in the recent literature some contemporary Kantians have defended a form of motivational internalism that, given Kant’s theory of motivation and rational agency, he cannot possibly hold. I argue that in order to clarify the nature of Kant’s motivational internalism, we need to consider the main features of Kant’s theory of motivation and rational agency. I show that, although it is not often recognised, Kant is in fact committed to two different internalist claims. The conclusion of the paper is that Kant’s motivational internalism is of a different kind than the one discussed in current debates of metaethics.
Keywords metaethics  Kant  motivation  internalism  rationalism
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DOI 10.1515/9783110246490.2481
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Forgiveness and Moral Development.Paula Satne - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1029-1055.

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