Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1419-1434 (2015)

Authors
Nathan Wildman
Tilburg University
Abstract
Bare particularism is a constituent ontology according to which substances—concrete, particular objects like people, tables, and tomatoes—are complex entities constituted by their properties and their bare particulars. Yet, aside from this description, much about bare particularism is fundamentally unclear. In this paper, I attempt to clarify this muddle by elucidating the key metaphysical commitments underpinning any plausible formulation of the position. So the aim here is primarily catechismal rather than evangelical—I don’t intend to convert anyone to bare particularism, but, by looking at a series of questions, to instead specify what, if one is a bare particularist, one is committed to. Along the way, I address three major objections: a classic objection about whether bare particulars have properties, a new objection raised by Bailey, and an understanding objection that questions some of the position’s resources
Keywords Bare particularism  Substratum theory  Thin particulars  Substance  Instantiation
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-014-0356-2
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References found in this work BETA

Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.
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Citations of this work BETA

Object.Bradley Rettler & Andrew M. Bailey - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Location of Properties.Nikk Effingham - 2015 - Noûs 49 (4):846-866.
Object.Henry Laycock - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Defending Constituent Ontology.Eric Yang - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (5):1207-1216.

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