Husserl Studies 31 (2):175-182 (2015)

Harald A. Wiltsche
Linkoping University
The debate about scientific realism has occupied center stage in philosophy of science since its very inception. The main question is whether or not scientific theories are true descriptions of the world. Or, to give the question a slightly different spin: What grounds do we have for believing in the reality of the unobservable entities postulated by contemporary science ? Although the main arena of this debate is analytic philosophy, it is clear that these questions are no less important for philosophers with phenomenological leanings. Should phenomenologists advocate SR or should they opt for scientific anti-realism ? And, on a more historical note, which of these options is most appropriate from the viewpoint of Husserl’s work?Such are the questions that Lee Hardy tries to answer in his book. Hardy’s main thesis is “that Husserl was indeed an instrumentalist, but that his instrumen ..
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DOI 10.1007/s10743-015-9167-3
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What is Wrong with Husserl's Scientific Anti-Realism?Harald A. Wiltsche - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (2):105-130.

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