Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):135 – 149 (1996)

John N. Williams
Singapore Management University
I argue that Moore's propositions, for example, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' cannot be rationally believed. Their assertors either cannot be rationally believed or cannot be believed to be rational. This analysis is extended to Moorean propositions such as God knows that I am an atheist and I believe that this proposition is false. I then defend the following definition of assertion: anyone asserts that p iff that person expresses a belief that p with the intention of causing relevant epistemic change in the cognition of an actual or potential audience
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DOI 10.1080/00048409612347111
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.

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Citations of this work BETA

Believing Things Unknown.Aidan McGlynn - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):385-407.
Assertion, Moore, and Bayes.Igor Douven - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):361-375.

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