Generalized probabilism: Dutch books and accuracy domi- nation

Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (5):811-840 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Jeff Paris proves a generalized Dutch Book theorem. If a belief state is not a generalized probability then one faces ‘sure loss’ books of bets. In Williams I showed that Joyce’s accuracy-domination theorem applies to the same set of generalized probabilities. What is the relationship between these two results? This note shows that both results are easy corollaries of the core result that Paris appeals to in proving his dutch book theorem. We see that every point of accuracy-domination defines a dutch book, but we only have a partial converse

Similar books and articles

Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):241-275.
Gradational accuracy and nonclassical semantics.J. Robert G. Williams - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):513-537.
Arbitrage and the Dutch Book Theorem.Robert Titiev - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Research 22:477-482.
A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
Depragmatized dutch book arguments.Patrick Maher - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (2):291-305.
Dutch Book Arguments and Consistency.Colin Howson - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:161 - 168.
Preference-based arguments for probabilism.David Christensen - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):356-376.
Is there a dutch book argument for probability kinematics?Brad Armendt - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (4):583-588.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-10-08

Downloads
521 (#31,600)

6 months
127 (#23,465)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Robert Williams
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Graded Incoherence for Accuracy-Firsters.Glauber De Bona & Julia Staffel - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (2):189-213.
Rational Probabilistic Incoherence.Michael Caie - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (4):527-575.
Indeterminate Oughts.J. Robert G. Williams - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):645-673.
Nonclassical Minds and Indeterminate Survival.J. Robert G. Williams - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (4):379-428.

View all 28 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
A Mathematical Theory of Evidence.Glenn Shafer - 1976 - Princeton University Press.
A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
Theories of Vagueness.Rosanna Keefe - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

View all 22 references / Add more references