Moore-paradoxical belief, conscious belief and the epistemic Ramsey test

Synthese 188 (2):231-246 (2012)
Authors
John N. Williams
Singapore Management University
Abstract
Chalmers and Hájek argue that on an epistemic reading of Ramsey’s test for the rational acceptability of conditionals, it is faulty. They claim that applying the test to each of a certain pair of conditionals requires one to think that one is omniscient or infallible, unless one forms irrational Moore-paradoxical beliefs. I show that this claim is false. The epistemic Ramsey test is indeed faulty. Applying it requires that one think of anyone as all-believing and if one is rational, to think of anyone as infallible-if-rational. But this is not because of Moore-paradoxical beliefs. Rather it is because applying the test requires a certain supposition about conscious belief. It is important to understand the nature of this supposition
Keywords Ramsey  Ramsey test  Moore  Chalmers  Hájek  Conditionals  Paradox  Belief  Conscious belief  Infallibility  Omniscience
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-011-9925-5
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References found in this work BETA

Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
Ramsey + Moore = God.David J. Chalmers & Alan Hájek - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):170-172.
Conditional Probabilities and Compounds of Conditionals.Vann McGee - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (4):485-541.

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