In Tomasz Bigaj & Christian Wuthrich (eds.), Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. pp. 251-306 (2015)

Authors
Jessica M. Wilson
University of Toronto at Scarborough
Jessica Wilson
University of Missouri, St. Louis
Abstract
Motivated by the seeming structure of the sciences, metaphysical emergence combines broadly synchronic dependence coupled with some degree of ontological and causal autonomy. Reflecting the diverse, frequently incompatible interpretations of the notions of dependence and autonomy, however, accounts of emergence diverge into a bewildering variety. Here I argue that much of this apparent diversity is superficial. I first argue, by attention to the problem of higher-level causation, that two and only two strategies for addressing this problem accommodate the genuine emergence of special science entities. These strategies in turn suggest two distinct schema for metaphysical emergence---'Weak' and 'Strong' emergence, respectively. Each schema imposes a condition on the powers of entities taken to be emergent: Strong emergence requires that higher-level features have more token powers than their dependence base features, whereas Weak emergence requires that higher-level features have a proper subset of the token powers of their dependence base features. Importantly, the notion of “power” at issue here is metaphysically neutral, primarily reflecting commitment just to the plausible thesis that what causes an entity may bring about are associated with how the entity is---that is, with its features
Keywords Emergence  Metaphysics  fundamentality  grounding  physicalism  British Emergentism  realization  degrees of freedom  determinable/determinate relation  subset realization
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References found in this work BETA

Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Emergent Properties.Hong Yu Wong - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The curious case of spacetime emergence.Sam Baron - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2207-2226.
Fundamentality.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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