Dissertation, Oxford (2005)

Authors
Alastair Wilson
University of Birmingham
Abstract
Recent work on probability in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics yields a decision-theoretic derivation of David Lewis’ Principal Principle, and hence a general metaphysical theory of probability; part 1 is a discussion of this remarkable result. I defend the claim that the ‘subjective uncertainty’ principle is required for the derivation to succeed, arguing that it amounts to a theoretical identification of chance. In part 2, I generalize this account, and suggest that the Everett interpretation, in combination with a plausible view of natural laws, has the potential to provide a reductive theory of metaphysical modality. I defend the resulting naturalistic modal realism, and outline some of its implications for other parts of metaphysics.
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Clarendon Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Truth and Truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
What is Structural Realism?James Ladyman - 1998 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (3):409-424.

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