Moore's paradox and conscious belief

Philosophical Studies 127 (3):383-414 (2006)
Authors
John N. Williams
Singapore Management University
Abstract
For Moore, it is a paradox that although I would be absurd in asserting that (it is raining but I don
Keywords Assertion  Belief  Epistemology  Paradox  Thought  Brentano, Franz  Moore, G E (george Edward)  Rosenthal, David
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-004-7826-x
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
Indicative Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (3):269-286.
A Reply to My Critics.George Edward Moore - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Open Court.

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Citations of this work BETA

Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.

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