Moral Progress Without Moral Realism

Philosophical Papers 39 (1):97-116 (2010)

Authors
Catherine Wilson
CUNY Graduate Center
Abstract
This paper argues that we can acknowledge the existence of moral truths and moral progress without being committed to moral realism. Rather than defending this claim through the more familiar route of the attempted analysis of the ontological commitments of moral claims, I show how moral belief change for the better shares certain features with theoretical progress in the natural sciences. Proponents of the better theory are able to convince their peers that it is formally and empirically superior to its rivals, and the better theory may be promoted to the status of the truth. Yet there is no 'decision-procedure' for ethics any more than there is for molecular biology. The betterness of true theories can be grasped through what I term 'undirectional narratives' of progress. And while there are true moral claims and perhaps numerous moral truths yet to be discovered, we should reject currently popular forms of moral realism with bivalence. Some moral claims lend themselves to the construction of fully reversible, bi-directional narratives and are likely neither true nor false
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DOI 10.1080/05568641003669508
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References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

V—Moral Truth: Observational or Theoretical?Catherine Wilson - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):97-114.
Moral Progress: An Introduction.Albert W. Musschenga & Gerben Meynen - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (1):3-15.
The Scientific Perspective on Moral Objectivity.Catherine Wilson - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):723-736.

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