Moral Truth: Observational or Theoretical?

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):97-114 (2011)
Abstract
Moral properties are widely held to be response-dependent properties of actions, situations, events and persons. There is controversy as to whether the putative response-dependence of these properties nullifies any truth-claims for moral judgements, or rather supports them. The present paper argues that moral judgements are more profitably compared with theoretical judgements in the natural sciences than with the judgements of immediate sense-perception. The notion of moral truth is dependent on the notion of moral knowledge, which in turn is best understood as a possible endpoint of theory change for the better
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00300.x
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References found in this work BETA
Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments.Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):29-43.
Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63:89-174.

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