Nonclassical Minds and Indeterminate Survival

Philosophical Review 123 (4):379-428 (2014)
Authors
Robert Williams
University of Leeds
Abstract
Revisionary theories of logic or truth require revisionary theories of mind. This essay outlines nonclassically based theories of rational belief, desire, and decision making, singling out the supervaluational family for special attention. To see these nonclassical theories of mind in action, this essay examines a debate between David Lewis and Derek Parfit over what matters in survival. Lewis argued that indeterminacy in personal identity allows caring about psychological connectedness and caring about personal identity to amount to the same thing. The essay argues that Lewis's treatment of two of Parfit's puzzle cases—degreed survival and fission—presuppose different nonclassical treatments of belief and desire
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-2749710
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Rational Illogicality.J. Robert G. Williams - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):127-141.
Epistemic Dilemmas and Rational Indeterminacy.Nick Leonard - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-24.

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