Philosophical Studies 131 (1):61-99 (2006)

Authors
Jessica M. Wilson
University of Toronto at Scarborough
Abstract
How should physical entities be characterized? Physicalists, who have most to do with the notion, usually characterize the physical by reference to two components: 1. The physical entities are the entities treated by fundamental physics with the proviso that 2. Physical entities are not fundamentally mental (that is, do not individually possess or bestow mentality) Here I explore the extent to which the appeals to fundamental physics and to the NFM (“no fundamental mentality”) constraint are appropriate for characterizing the physical, especially for purposes of formulating physicalism. Ultimately, I motivate and defend a version of an account incorporating both components: The physics-based NFM account: An entity existing at a world w is physical iff (i) it is treated, approximately accurately, by current or future (in the limit of inquiry, ideal) versions of fundamental physics at w, and (ii) it is not fundamentally mental (that is, does not individually either possess or bestow mentality).
Keywords Constraint  Dualism  Metaphysics  Motivation  Physicalism  Physics
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-006-5984-8
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References found in this work BETA

The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.

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Citations of this work BETA

Verbal Disputes.David Chalmers - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):515-566.
Material Through and Through.Andrew M. Bailey - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2431-2450.
Physicalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Metaphysical Emergence: Weak and Strong.Jessica Wilson - 2015 - In Tomasz Bigaj & Christian Wuthrich (eds.), Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. pp. 251-306.

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