Perception and Reality

New Philosopher 1 (2):104-107 (2013)

Authors
Keith A. Wilson
University of Oslo
Abstract
Taken at face value, the picture of reality suggested by modern science seems radically opposed to the world as we perceive it through our senses. Indeed, it is not uncommon to hear scientists and others claim that much of our perceptual experience is a kind of pervasive illusion rather than a faithful presentation of various aspects of reality. On this view, familiar properties such as colours and solidity, to take just two examples, do not belong to external objects, but are fictions generated by the brain that we mistakenly ascribe to the world around us. Contrary to this view, I argue that properties like colour and solidity are as much a part of the fabric of reality as gravity and electrons, and that our scientific and common-sense world views are not as opposed to one another as it might first appear.
Keywords perception  reality  direct realism  scientific realism  philosophy of science  illusion
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Spatial Content of Experience.Brad Thompson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.
McDowell, Phenomenology and the Awareness of the World.Donnchadh O'Conaill - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (4):499-518.
Ciencia, Sentido Comun Y Realidad.Howard Sankey - 2010 - Discusiones Filosóficas 16 (16):41-58.
Skepticism About the External World.Panayot Butchvarov - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Two Charges of Intellectualism Against Kant.Arthur Melnick - 2013 - Kantian Review 18 (2):197-219.
Guest Editor’s Introduction.Ralph Schumacher - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):1-8.
Inter-Species Variation in Colour Perception.Keith Allen - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):197 - 220.
William James’s Conception of Reality.Sarah E. Glenn - 2003 - International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2):207-218.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-11-08

Total views
538 ( #9,226 of 2,310,278 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #31,859 of 2,310,278 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature