Peer Disagreement: Special Cases

Logos and Episteme 9 (2):221-226 (2018)
Authors
Eric Wiland
University of Missouri, St. Louis
Abstract
When you discover that an epistemic peer disagrees with you about some matter, does rationality require you to alter your views? Concessivists answer in the affirmative, but their view faces a problem in special cases. As others have noted, if concessivism itself is what’s under dispute, then concessivism seems to undermine itself. But there are other unexplored special cases too. This article identifies three such special cases, and argues that concessivists in fact face no special problem.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme20189217
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,077
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Philosophical Peer Disagreement.Nicolás Lo Guercio - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (3):459-467.
Disagreement: Idealized and Everyday.Jonathan Matheson - 2014 - In Jonathan Matheson Rico Vitz (ed.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. Oxford University Press. pp. 315-330.
Peer-Hood.Richard Vulich - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (1):125-38.
Who is an Epistemic Peer?Axel Gelfert - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (4):507-514.
The Organism View Defended.S. Matthew Liao - 2006 - The Monist 89 (3):334-350.
Peer-Disagreement About Restaurant Bills and Abortion.Martin Sticker - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (4):577-604.
Disagreement and Epistemic Peers.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Oxford Handbooks Online.
Is It Safe to Disagree?Jaakko Hirvelä - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):305-321.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-07-16

Total views
4 ( #836,642 of 2,313,316 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #353,451 of 2,313,316 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature