Personhood, Ethics, and Disability: A Comparison of Byzantine, Boethian, and Modern Concepts of Personhood

In Disability in Medieval Christian Philosophy and Theology. Oxford: Routledge. pp. 80-108 (2020)
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Abstract

This chapter compares three different general accounts of personhood (Byzantine, Boethian, and Modern) and argues that if personhood is the basis on which one has equal moral status in the moral community and the disability-positive position is correct, then the Byzantine and Boethian accounts are preferable over the Modern accounts that are surveyed here. It further argues that the Byzantine account is even friendlier to a disability-positive position compared to the Boethian account.

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Scott M. Williams
University of North Carolina, Asheville

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