Authors
Evan Gregg Williams
University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh
Abstract
_ Source: _Page Count 24 Moral theories which include a preference-fulfillment aspect should not restrict their concern to some subset of people’s preferences such as “now-for-now” preferences. Instead, preferences with all contents—e.g. ones which are external, diachronic, or even modal—should be taken into account. I offer a conceptualization of preferences and preference fulfillment which allows us to understand odd species of preferences, and I give a series of examples showing what it would mean to fulfill such preferences and why we ought to do so
Keywords posthumous harm   preference fulfillment   preference utilitarianism   modal preferences
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DOI 10.1163/17455243-4681064
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References found in this work BETA

Moral Problems of Population.Jan Narveson - 1973 - The Monist 57 (1):62-86.
Death and the Value of Life.Jeff McMahan - 1988 - Ethics 99 (1):32-61.
Desire Fulfillment and Posthumous Harm.Douglas W. Portmore - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):27 - 38.

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