Rational Illogicality
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):127-141 (2018)
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| Abstract |
Many accounts of structural rationality give a special role to logic. This paper reviews the problem case of clear-eyed logical uncertainty. An account of rational norms on belief that does not give a special role to logic is developed: doxastic probabilism.
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| Reprint years | 2017, 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2017.1323933 |
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References found in this work BETA
A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
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Citations of this work BETA
Solving the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Sinan Dogramaci - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):107-128.
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2017-06-17
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52 ( #124,906 of 2,293,866 )
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27 ( #15,826 of 2,293,866 )
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