Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (1988)
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Abstract

This book explores the scope and limits of the concept of personDS a vexed question in contemporary philosophy. The author begins by questioning the methodology of thought-experimentation, arguing that it engenders inconclusive and unconvincing results, and that truth is stranger than fiction. She then examines an assortment of real-life conditions, including infancy, insanity andx dementia, dissociated states, and split brains. The popular faith in continuity of consciousness, and the unity of the person is subjected to sustained criticism. The author concludes with a look at different views of the person found in Homer, Aristotle, the post-Cartesians, and contemporary cognitive science

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Citations of this work

How the Body Shapes the Mind.Shaun Gallagher - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Is human information processing conscious?Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.
The psychology of folk psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.
Evidence against epiphenomenalism.Ned Block - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):670-672.

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