Reply to John Hawthorne and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio

1. As John Hawthorne and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio appreciate, some of the central issues raised in their ‘Knowledge and Objective Chance’ arise for all but the most extreme theories of knowledge. In a wide range of cases, according to very plausible everyday judgments, we know something about the future, even though, according to quantum mechanics, our belief has a small but nonzero chance (objective probability) of being untrue. In easily constructed examples, we are in that position simultaneously with respect to many different propositions about the future that are equiprobable and probabilistically independent of each other, at least to a reasonable approximation.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,803
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Single Premise Deduction and Risk.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (2):157 - 173.
Knowledge and Objective Chance.John Hawthorne & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2009 - In Patrick Greenough & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 92--108.
Chance and Actuality.Moritz Schulz - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):105-129.
Reply to Hawthorne.Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2).
Added to PP index

Total downloads
87 ( #62,261 of 2,202,706 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #301,061 of 2,202,706 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature