Reply to John Hawthorne and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
1. As John Hawthorne and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio appreciate, some of the central issues raised in their ‘Knowledge and Objective Chance’ arise for all but the most extreme theories of knowledge. In a wide range of cases, according to very plausible everyday judgments, we know something about the future, even though, according to quantum mechanics, our belief has a small but nonzero chance (objective probability) of being untrue. In easily constructed examples, we are in that position simultaneously with respect to many different propositions about the future that are equiprobable and probabilistically independent of each other, at least to a reasonable approximation.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Epistemic Closure Under Deductive Inference: What is It and Can We Afford It?Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2731-2748.
Similar books and articles
Single Premise Deduction and Risk.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (2):157 - 173.
Knowledge and Objective Chance.John Hawthorne & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2009 - In Patrick Greenough & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 92--108.
Externalism and A Priori Knowledge of the World: Why Privileged Access is Not the Issue.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (4):433-445.
Why the Externalist is Better Off Without Free Logic: A Reply to McKinsey.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):535-540.
Reply to Hawthorne.Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2).
Quantum Probabilities and the Conjunction Principle.Igor Douven & Jos Uffink - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):109-114.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads87 ( #59,289 of 2,163,617 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #188,991 of 2,163,617 )
How can I increase my downloads?