Scientific freedom: its grounds and their limitations

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (2):174-181 (2010)
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Abstract

In various debates about science, appeal is made to the freedom of scientific research. A rationale in favor of this freedom is rarely offered. In this paper, two major arguments are reconstructed that promise to lend support to a principle of scientific freedom. According to the epistemological argument, freedom of research is required in order to organize the collective cognitive effort we call science efficiently. According to the political argument, scientific knowledge needs to be generated in ways that are independent of the major political powers because of the important role it plays for the citizens and their capacity to form well-informed political preferences. Both arguments are examined critically in order to identify their strengths and limitations. I argue that the scientific freedom established by both rests on a number of critical preconditions, and that the arguments’ force must be weighed against competing societal interests and values in each case of their application. Appeal to a principle of scientific freedom should therefore never mark the end, but rather the beginning of a public debate about the ends and means of science.

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Torsten Wilholt
Universität Hannover

Citations of this work

The irreducibility of value-freedom to theory assessment.Anke Bueter - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49:18-26.
Science, institutions, and values.C. Mantzavinos - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):379-392.
Revisiting the Basic/Applied Science Distinction: The Significance of Urgent Science for Science Funding Policy.Jamie Shaw - 2022 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 53 (4):477-499.
Fake Research: How Can We Recognise it and Respond to it?Martin Carrier - 2023 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 36 (3):247-264.

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References found in this work

Science, truth, and democracy.Philip Kitcher - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Objective knowledge: an evolutionary approach.Karl Raimund Popper - 1972 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Objective Knowledge.K. R. Popper - 1972 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 4 (2):388-398.

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