Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):141-153 (2001)
The theory-theory claims that the explanation and prediction of behavior works via the application of a theory, while the simulation theory claims that explanation works by putting ourselves in others' places and noting what we would do. On either account, in order to develop a prediction or explanation of another person's behavior, one first needs to have a characterization of that person's current or recent actions. Simulation requires that I have some grasp of the other person's behavior to project myself upon; whereas theorizing requires a subject matter to theorize about. The frame problem shows that multiple, true characterizations are possible for any behavior or situation. However, only one or a few of these characterizations are relevant to explaining or predicting behavior. Since different characterizations of a behavior lead to different predictions or explanations, much of the work of interpersonal interpretation is done in the process of finding this characterization - that is, prior to either theorizing or simulating. Moreover, finding this characterization involves extensive knowledge of the physical, cultural, and social worlds of the persons involved
|Keywords||Application Behavior Frame Person Psychology Science Simulation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.
Simulation Without Introspection or Inference From Me to You.Robert M. Gordon - 1995 - In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell.
Co-Cognition and Off-Line Simulation: Two Ways of Understanding the Simulation Approach.Jane Heal - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (4):477-498.
Citations of this work BETA
Moral Cognition, Affect, and Psychopathy.Michelle Maiese - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):807-828.
Situating Emotions: From Embodied Cognition to Mindreading.Leon de Bruin, Derek Strijbos & Marc Slors - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):173-184.
Folk Psychology Without Principles: An Alternative to the Belief-Desire Model of Action Interpretation.Leon de Bruin & Derek Strijbos - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):257-274.
Similar books and articles
Simulation as an Epistemic Tool Between Theory and Practice: A Comparison of the Relationship Between Theory and Simulation in Science and Folk Psychology.John Michael - 2007 - EPSA07.
Knowing Mental States: The Asymmetry of Psychological Prediction and Explanation.Kristin Andrews - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
Varieties of Off-Line Simulation.Shaun Nichols, Stephen P. Stich, Alan M. Leslie & David B. Klein - 1996 - In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Cambridge University Press. pp. 39-74.
The Practice of Mind: Theory, Simulation or Primary Interaction?Shaun Gallagher - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):83-108.
Simulation Theory.Robert M. Gordon & Joe Cruz - 2002 - In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
Folk Psychology and the Explanation of Human Behavior.Paul M. Churchland - 1988 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62:209-21.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads62 ( #84,974 of 2,172,029 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #325,967 of 2,172,029 )
How can I increase my downloads?