Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):141-153 (2001)

Abstract
The theory-theory claims that the explanation and prediction of behavior works via the application of a theory, while the simulation theory claims that explanation works by putting ourselves in others' places and noting what we would do. On either account, in order to develop a prediction or explanation of another person's behavior, one first needs to have a characterization of that person's current or recent actions. Simulation requires that I have some grasp of the other person's behavior to project myself upon; whereas theorizing requires a subject matter to theorize about. The frame problem shows that multiple, true characterizations are possible for any behavior or situation. However, only one or a few of these characterizations are relevant to explaining or predicting behavior. Since different characterizations of a behavior lead to different predictions or explanations, much of the work of interpersonal interpretation is done in the process of finding this characterization - that is, prior to either theorizing or simulating. Moreover, finding this characterization involves extensive knowledge of the physical, cultural, and social worlds of the persons involved
Keywords Application  Behavior  Frame  Person  Psychology  Science  Simulation
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515080120051535
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 57,077
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Frame Problem.Murray Shanahan - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Moral Cognition, Affect, and Psychopathy.Michelle Maiese - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):807-828.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
81 ( #123,284 of 2,411,493 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #538,999 of 2,411,493 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes