Transhumanism and moral equality

Bioethics 21 (8):419–425 (2007)
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Abstract

Conservative thinkers such as Francis Fukuyama have produced a battery of objections to the transhumanist project of fundamentally enhancing human capacities. This article examines one of these objections, namely that by allowing some to greatly extend their capacities, we will undermine the fundamental moral equality of human beings. I argue that this objection is groundless: once we understand the basis for human equality, it is clear that anyone who now has sufficient capacities to count as a person from the moral point of view will continue to count as one even if others are fundamentally enhanced; and it is mistaken to think that a creature which had even far greater capacities than an unenhanced human being should count as more than an equal from the moral point of view.

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James Wilson
University College London

Citations of this work

The Morality of Moral Neuroenhancement.Thomas Douglas - forthcoming - In Clausen Jens & Levy Neil (eds.), Handbook of Neuroethics. Springer.
Human Enhancement and Supra-Personal Moral Status.Thomas Douglas - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):473-497.
Why Should We Become Posthuman? The Beneficence Argument Questioned.Andrés Pablo Vaccari - 2019 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 44 (2):192-219.
The Harms of Enhancement and the Conclusive Reasons View.Thomas Douglas - 2015 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 24 (1):23-36.
Persons, Post-Persons and Thresholds.James Wilson - 2012 - Journal of Medical Ethics 38 (3):143-144.

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References found in this work

A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition.John Rawls - 1999 - Harvard University Press.
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.John Rawls (ed.) - 2001 - Harvard University Press.
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.C. L. Ten - 2003 - Mind 112 (447):563-566.
In Defense of Posthuman Dignity.Nick Bostrom - 2005 - Bioethics 19 (3):202–214.

View all 8 references / Add more references