In Matthew Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge. pp. 145-165 (2013)

Authors
Jessica M. Wilson
University of Toronto at Scarborough
Abstract
In what does philosophical progress consist? 'Vertical' progress corresponds to development within a specific paradigm/framework for theorizing (of the sort associated, revolutions aside, with science); 'horizontal' progress corresponds to the identification and cultivation of diverse paradigms (of the sort associated, conservativism aside, with art and pure mathematics). Philosophical progress seems to involve both horizontal and vertical dimensions, in a way that is somewhat puzzling: philosophers work in a number of competing frameworks (like artists or mathematicians), while typically maintaining that only one of these is correct (like scientists). I diagnose this situation as reflecting that we are presently quite far from the end of inquiry into philosophical methodology. The good news is that we appear to be making advances on this score. The bad news is that failure to recognize or make explicit that our standards are in flux often leads to dogmatism, as I illustrate by attention to three assumptions presently operative in metaphysical and metametaphysical contexts. I close by identifying a tension between vertical and horizontal progress in philosophy, and suggesting an updated version of Carnap's principle of tolerance for new philosophical forms.
Keywords methodology  metaphysics  metametaphysics  Carnap  Quine  epistemology  metaontology  quantification  Hume's dictum  necessary connections
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2013
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,323
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Parts: A Study in Ontology.Peter Simons - 1987 - Oxford University Press.
Causality.Judea Pearl - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
The Structure of Objects.Kathrin Koslicki - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
What is a Law of Nature?David M. Armstrong - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 40 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Intelligibility of Metaphysical Structure.Peter Finocchiaro - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):581-606.
Three Barriers to Philosophical Progress.Jessica Wilson - 2017 - In Russell Blackford & Damien Broderick (eds.), Philosophy's Future: The Problem of Philosophical Progress. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Blackwell. pp. 91--104.
Metaphysics as Fairness.Sam Baron - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2237-2259.
Essence and Dependence.Jessica Wilson M. - forthcoming - In Mircea Dumitru (ed.), Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine. Oxford University Press.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Putting the Bite Back Into 'Two Dogmas'.Paul Gregory - 2003 - Principia 7 (1-2):115-129.
‘Two Dogmas’ -- All Bark and No Bite?: Carnap and Quine on Analyticity.Paul A. Gregory - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):633–648.
Every Dogma has its Day.Richard Creath - 1991 - Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):347-389.
What is Hume's Dictum, and Why Believe It?Jessica Wilson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):595 - 637.
‘Two Dogmas’ -- All Bark and No Bite?: Carnap and Quine on Analyticity.Paul A. Gregory - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):633 - 648.
Introduction : A Guided Tour of Metametaphysics.David Manley - 2009 - In David Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-12-10

Total views
283 ( #33,044 of 2,448,717 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #63,932 of 2,448,717 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes