The intentionality of consciousness and consciousness of intentionality

In G Forrai (ed.), Intentionality: Past and Future. Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi (2005)

Abstract

Some philosophers think that intentionality is ontologically distinct from phenomenal consciousness; call this the Thesis of Separation. Terence Horgan and John Tienson (2002, p. 520) call this.

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Kenneth Williford
University of Texas at Arlington

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