Two kinds of deviance

History and Philosophy of Logic 10 (1):15-28 (1989)
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In this paper I argue that there can be genuine (as opposed to merely verbal) disputes about whether a sentence form is logically true or an argument form is valid. I call such disputes ?cases of deviance?, of which I distinguish a weak and a strong form. Weak deviance holds if one disputant is right and the other wrong, but the available evidence is insufficient to determine which is which. Strong deviance holds if there is no fact of the matter. In section 2 I argue that weak deviance need not be trivial and may even be interesting. Section 3 considers what it could mean to say that logic is determined by a theory, especially a theory of meaning, an idea that arises in section 2. In section 4 I discuss the dispute between classical and relevance logicians over entailment and argue that it is a case of strong deviance. Finally, in section 5 I show that the result of the previous section is not absolute but relative to the background logic used in reaching it



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William Hanson
University of Minnesota

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References found in this work

On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.
Meaning.Herbert Paul Grice - 1957 - Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388.
Philosophy of logic.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1970 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Edited by Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons.
Truth and other enigmas.Michael Dummett - 1978 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
On referring.Peter F. Strawson - 1950 - Mind 59 (235):320-344.

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