The Thomist 62 (2):193-215 (1998)

Authors
Thomas Williams
University of South Florida
Abstract
After setting out in part 1 Scotus's libertarian account of the will, I shall discuss two of the most important implications Scotus understood his account to have. First, according to Scotus, the Thomist understanding of the will as intellective appetite is inadequate to provide a libertarian account of freedom. Scotus therefore rejects that understanding and offers an alternative moral psychology. In part 2 of the paper I therefore draw attention to the passages in which Scotus offers his reasons for rejecting Aquinas's account in order to show that they arise directly out of the libertarian account of the will I stated in part 1. I then ask whether Scotus is in fact justified in supposing that Aquinas's conception of will is incompatible with freedom as Scotus understood it. In parts 3 and 4 of the paper I shall argue that he is, since Aquinas's conception of possibility at best allows him to make room for diachronic alternatives, whereas Scotus insists on synchronic alternatives. The second implication of Scotus's libertarian understanding of freedom is his distinctive conception of choice and of rationality in action. In part 5 of the paper I explain this conception and show why Scotus associates it with a libertarian understanding of freedom.
Keywords libertarianism  synchronic alternatives  John Duns Scotus  Thomas Aquinas  intellectual appetite
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,682
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Voluntary Action and Rational Sin in Anselm of Canterbury.Tomas Ekenberg - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (2):215-230.
Poder Absoluto E Conhecimento Moral.Roberto Pich - 2010 - Filosofia Unisinos 11 (2):141-162.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Unmitigated Scotus.Thomas Williams - 1998 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 80 (2):162-181.
Giovanni Duns Scoto – Una introduzione bibliografica.Franco Todescan - 2005 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (3):5-40.
Libertarian Self-Defeat.Evan Riley - 2010 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2):200-226.
John Duns Scotus.Thomas Williams - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Fraqueza da vontade no voluntarismo? Investigações sobre João Duns Scotus.Jörn Müller - 2005 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (3):117-138.
Recent Work on the Philosophy of Duns Scotus.Richard Cross - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (8):667-675.
The Distinction Between Nature and Will in Duns Scotus.Tobias Hoffmann - 1999 - Archives D’Histoire Doctrinale Et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 66:189-224.
Sobre a vida e a obra de Duns Scotus.Luís Alberto De Boni - 2008 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 53 (3).
Postmodernism Vs. Postlibertarianism.Jeffrey Friedman - 1991 - Critical Review 5 (2):145-158.
Truth in Metaphysics.Michael Robinson - 2009 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 83 (4):467-490.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-10-31

Total views
31 ( #319,480 of 2,349,382 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #239,083 of 2,349,382 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes