Philosophical Quarterly 46 (184):371-381 (1996)

Clifford Williams
Trinity International University
The traditional description of A- and B-time is that the former consists of a mind-independent past, present, and future, and that the latter consists solely of the time relations--earlier than, simultaneous with, and later than. Although this description makes it look as if there are two clearly contrasting concepts of time, it does not differentiate the passage of A-time from the succession in B-time. Nor does it explain what it means for events in B-time to be equally real and for events in A-time not to be equally real. I argue that although McTaggart and numerous others have thought that there is a difference between the two kinds of time, it remains undescribed.
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DOI 10.2307/2956448
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On Absolute Becoming and the Myth of Passage.Steven F. Savitt - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50:153-167.
Perpetual Present: Henri Bergson and Atemporal Duration.Matyáš Moravec - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11 (3):197.
A-Theory for B-Theorists.Josh Parsons - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):1-20.

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