The Phenomenology of B-Time

Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):123-137 (1992)
I argue that our experience of time supports the B-Theory of time and not the A-Theory of time. We do not experience pastness, presentness, and futurity as mind-independent properties of events. My method in supporting this experiential claim is to show that our experience of presentness is like our experience of hereness--in neither case are we aware of a mind-independent property over and above the events or objects to which we ascribe the presentness or hereness.
Keywords Experience  Metaphysics  Phenomenology  Theory  Time
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DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1992.tb01719.x
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