The regress argument against Cartesian skepticism

Analysis 72 (4):668-673 (2012)
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Abstract

I argue that Cartesian skepticism about the external world leads to a vicious regress of skeptical attitudes, the only principled and unproblematic response to which requires refraining from taking the very first skeptical step.

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2012-06-07

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Jessica M. Wilson
University of Toronto at Scarborough

References found in this work

The philosophical writings of Descartes.René Descartes - 1984 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Epistemic operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 21 (1):22-28.

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