Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (4):715-732 (2018)

Authors
Isaac Wilhelm
National University of Singapore
Abstract
I derive a sufficient condition for a belief set to be representable by a probability function: if at least one comparative confidence ordering of a certain type satisfies Scott’s axiom, then the belief set used to induce that ordering is representable. This provides support for Kenny Easwaran’s project of analyzing doxastic states in terms of belief sets rather than credences.
Keywords Formal Epistemology  Probability  Credence
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-017-9448-8
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The Paradox of the Preface.David C. Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205.
``The Paradox of the Preface".D. Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.
Reducing Belief Simpliciter to Degrees of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2013 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1338-1389.

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