In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--204 (2009)
First, some reminiscences. In the years 1973-80, when I was an undergraduate and then graduate student at Oxford, Michael Dummett’s formidable and creative philosophical presence made his arguments impossible to ignore. In consequence, one pole of discussion was always a form of anti-realism. It endorsed something like the replacement of truth-conditional semantics by verification-conditional semantics and of classical logic by intuitionistic logic, and the principle that all truths are knowable. It did not endorse the principle that all truths are known. Nor did it mention the now celebrated argument, first published by Frederic Fitch (1963), that if all truths are knowable then all truths are known.
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On a New Tentative Solution to Fitch’s Paradox.Alessandro Giordani - 2015 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):597-611.
Discovering Knowability: A Semantic Analysis.Sergei Artemov & Tudor Protopopescu - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3349-3376.
Some Remarks on Restricting the Knowability Principle.Martin Fischer - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):63-88.
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Not Every Truth Can Be Known (at Least, Not All at Once).Greg Restall - 2009 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. pp. 339--354.
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