The Typical Principle

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)
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If a proposition is typically true, given your evidence, then you should believe that proposition; or so I argue here. In particular, in this paper, I propose and defend a principle of rationality---call it the `Typical Principle'---which links rational belief to facts about what is typical. As I show, this principle avoids several problems that other, seemingly similar principles face. And as I show, in many cases, this principle implies the verdicts of the Principal Principle: so ultimately, the Typical Principle may be the more fundamental of the two.

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Isaac Wilhelm
National University of Singapore

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References found in this work

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
The paradox of the preface.David C. Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.
Belief Is Credence One (in Context).Roger Clarke - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.
``The Paradox of the Preface".D. C. Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.

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