The Ways We Think: From the Straits of Reason to the Possibilities of Thought

Wiley-Blackwell (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The Ways We Think critiques predominant approaches to the development of thinking in education and seeks to offer a new account of thought informed by phenomenology, post-structuralism and the ‘ordinary language’ philosophical traditions. Presents an original account of thinking for education and explores how this alternative conception of thought might be translated into the classroom Explores connections between phenomenology, post-structuralism and ordinary language philosophical traditions Examines the relevance of language in accounts of how we think Investigates the philosophical accounts of Gilbert Ryle, Martin Heidegger, John Austin and Jacques Derrida Draws upon experience of own teaching practice as philosopher-in-residence.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Non-absolute rights and libertarian taxation.Eric Mack - 2006 - Social Philosophy and Policy 23 (2):109-141.
Is God beyond reason?Brian Davies - 2009 - Philosophical Investigations 32 (4):338-359.
Locke, ‘the Father of Modernity’?Pa Schouls - 1996 - Philosophia Reformata 61 (2):175-195.
Absolute-Brahma: Royce and the Upanishads.Joshua M. Hall - 2014 - Asian Philosophy 24 (2):121-132.
The Cosmopolitan Turn. Recasting 'dialogue' and 'difference'.Torill Strand - 2010 - Paideusis: Journal of the Canadian Philosophy of Education Society 19 (1):49 - 58.
Rationality without reasons.Judith Baker - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):763-782.
Ratio, Intelligere, and Cogitare in Anselm’s Ontological Argument.Catherine Nolan - 2009 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 83:199-208.
Heidegger and Leibniz: reason and the path.Renato Cristin - 1998 - Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-10-14

Downloads
7 (#1,356,784)

6 months
4 (#790,687)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references