Synthese 190 (6):997-1016 (2013)

Authors
Daniel Wilkenfeld
University of Pittsburgh
Abstract
Claims pertaining to understanding are made in a variety of contexts and ways. As a result, few in the philosophical literature have made an attempt to precisely characterize the state that is y understanding x. This paper builds an account that does just that. The account is motivated by two main observations. First, understanding x is somehow related to being able to manipulate x. Second, understanding is a mental phenomenon, and so what manipulations are required to be an understander must only be mental manipulations. Combining these two insights, the paper builds an account (URM) of understanding as a certain representational capacity—specifically, understanding x involves possessing a representation of x that could be manipulated in useful ways. By tying understanding to representation, the account correctly identifies that understanding is a fundamentally cognitive achievement. However, by also demanding that which representations count as understanding-conferring be determined by their practical effects, URM captures the insight that understanding is vitally connected to practice. URM is fully general, and can apply equally well to understanding states of affairs, understanding events, and even understanding people and works of art. The ultimate test of URM is its applicability in actual scientific and philosophical discourse. To that end the paper discusses the importance of understanding in the philosophy of science, psychology, and computer science
Keywords Explanation  Understanding  Philosophy of science  Philosophy of cognitive science
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-011-0055-x
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References found in this work BETA

The Scientific Image.C. Van Fraassen Bas - 1980 - Oxford University Press.
Making Things Happen.E. Hiddleston - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):545-547.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):285-318.
Scientific Progress: Knowledge Versus Understanding.Finnur Dellsén - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 56:72-83.
Understanding Phenomena.Christoph9 Kelp - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):3799-3816.
Testifying Understanding.Kenneth Boyd - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):103-127.

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