Vagueness as Indecision

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1):285-309 (2016)
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Abstract

This essay explores the thesis that for vague predicates, uncertainty over whether a borderline instance x of red/large/tall/good is to be understood as practical uncertainty over whether to treat x as red/large/tall/good. Expressivist and quasi-realist treatments of vague predicates due to John MacFarlane and Daniel Elstein provide the stalking-horse. It examines the notion of treating/counting a thing as F , and links a central question about our attitudes to vague predications to normative evaluation of plans to treat a thing as F . The essay examines how the account applies to normatively defective or contested terms. The final section raises a puzzle about the mechanics of MacFarlane’s detailed implementation for the case of gradable adjectives.

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Author's Profile

Robert Williams
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Vagueness.Roy Sorensen - 1997 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University.
Death by Redescription.Henry Pollock - 2022 - Philosophia 51 (1):309-328.

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References found in this work

Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - New York: Routledge.
In contradiction: a study of the transconsistent.Graham Priest - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.
Essays in quasi-realism.Simon Blackburn - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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