David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press (2003)
When I take off my glasses, the world looks blurred. When I put them back on, it looks sharpedged. I do not think that the world really was blurred; I know that what changed was my relation to the distant physical objects ahead, not those objects themselves. I am more inclined to believe that the world really is and was sharp-edged. Is that belief any more reasonable than the belief that the world really is and was blurred? I see more accurately with my glasses on than off, so visual appearances when they are on have some cognitive priority over visual appearances when they are off. If I must choose which kind of visual appearance to take at face value, I will choose the sharp-edged look. But what should I think when I see a mist, which looks very blurred however well I am seeing? Indeed, why choose to take any of the looks at face value? Why not regard all the choices as illegitimate projections of ways of seeing the world onto the world itself?
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J. Robert G. Williams (2008). Ontic Vagueness and Metaphysical Indeterminacy. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):763-788.
Daniel Z. Korman (2010). The Argument From Vagueness. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):891-901.
Matthew McGrath (2007). Temporal Parts. Philosophy Compass 2 (5):730–748.
Ryan Perkins & Tim Bayne (2013). Representationalism and the Problem of Vagueness. Philosophical Studies 162 (1):71-86.
Thomas Sattig (2013). Vague Objects and the Problem of the Many. Metaphysica 14 (2):211-223.
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