Wide computationalism

Mind 103 (411):351-72 (1994)
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Abstract

The computational argument for individualism, which moves from computationalism to individualism about the mind, is problematic, not because computationalism is false, but because computational psychology is, at least sometimes, wide. The paper provides an early, or perhaps predecessor, version of the thesis of extended cognition.

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Robert A. Wilson
University of Western Australia

Citations of this work

The extended mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
Minds: extended or scaffolded?Kim Sterelny - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):465-481.
Varieties of the extended self.Richard Heersmink - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 85:103001.

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