What Computations Can't Do: Jerry Fodor on Computation and Modularity

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1):407-425 (2004)
Authors
Robert A. Wilson
La Trobe University
Abstract
Fodor's thinking on modularity has been influential throughout a range of the areas studying cognition, chiefly as a prod for positive work on modularity and domain-specificity. In _The Mind Doesn't Work That Way_, Fodor has developed the dark message of _The Modularity of Mind_ regarding the limits to modularity and computational analyses. This paper offers a critical assessment of Fodor's scepticism with an eye to highlighting some broader issues in play, including the nature of computation and the role of recent empirical developments in the cognitive sciences in assessing Fodor's position.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0045-5091  
DOI 10.1080/00455091.2004.10717612
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 37,134
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.
Coherence in Thought and Action (M. Amini).P. Thagard - 2000 - Philosophical Books 43 (2):136-140.
Reasons, Robots and the Extended Mind.Andy Clark - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (2):121-145.

View all 25 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On Fodor's The Mind Doesn't Work That Way.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):551-562.
A Reply to Jerry Fodor on How the Mind Works.Steven Pinker - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (1):33-38.
On the Input Problem for Massive Modularity.John M. Collins - 2004 - Minds and Machines 15 (1):1-22.
Interview - Jerry Fodor.Jerry Fodor - 2008 - The Philosophers' Magazine 40 (40):40-41.
Fodor on Cognition, Modularity, and Adaptationism.Samir Okasha - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (1):68-88.
The Modularity of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - In Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.), Philosophical Review. Ablex. pp. 101-108.
The Modularity of Mind.Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Is the Mind Really Modular?Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell. pp. 22--36.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
401 ( #9,747 of 2,308,403 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #88,509 of 2,308,403 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature