Why contingent identity is necessary

Philosophical Studies 43 (3):301 - 327 (1983)
Abstract
This paper argues that the principle of necessary identity (f)(g)(f=g then necessarily f=g) cannot be maintained, At least in second order form. A paradox based upon scientific definitional practice is introduced to demonstrate this. A non-Fregean reading of standard contingent identity semantics is provided to explain how such 'definition breaking' works
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DOI 10.1007/BF00372368
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References found in this work BETA
Mind, Language, and Reality.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Cambridge University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic.Saul A. Kripke - 1963 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 16 (1963):83-94.

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Natural Kinds and the Identity of Property.Chang Seong Hong - 1998 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):89-98.
Identity and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1971 - In Milton K. Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York University Press. pp. 135-164.

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