What makes it a Heap?

Erkenntnis 44 (3):327 - 339 (1996)
On the epistemic view of vagueness, a vague expression has sharp boundaries whose location speakers of the language cannot recognize. The paper argues that one of the deepest sources of resistance to the epistemic view is the idea that all truths are cognitively accessible from truths in a language for natural science, conceived as precise, in a sense explained. The implications of the epistemic view for issues about the relations between vague predicates and scientific predicates are investigated.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00167662
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References found in this work BETA
Roy A. Sorensen (1988). Blindspots. Oxford University Press.
Timothy Williamson (2010). Vagueness and Ignorance. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume. Routledge. pp. 145 - 177.

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Timothy Williamson (2000). Margins for Error: A Reply. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):76-81.

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