Reductive Views of Knowledge and the Small Difference Principle

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (8):777-788 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I develop a challenge to reductive views of knowing that φ that appeal to what I call a gradable property. Such appeal allows for properties that are intrinsically very similar to the property of knowing that φ, but differ significantly in their normative significance. This violates the independently plausible claim Pautz (2017) labels the small difference principle.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Know How to Transmit Knowledge?Ted Poston - 2015 - Noûs 50 (4):865-878.
Hume = small Hume.Jeffrey Ketland - 2002 - Analysis 62 (1):92–93.
Remarks on personal and impersonal knowledge.Risto Hilpinen - 1977 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):1-9.
The Self-Knowledge Gambit.Berislav Marušić - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):1977-1999.
Rawls különbözeti elve (Rawls’ Difference Principle).Attila Tanyi - 2007 - Hungarian Review of Political Science (Politikatudomanyi Szemle) 16 (2):125-150.
Intellectualism and Testimony.Yuri Cath - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):1-9.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-01-18

Downloads
31 (#504,675)

6 months
15 (#159,128)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Simon Wimmer
TU Dortmund

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Elusive knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.
Grounding: Toward a Theory of the I n-Virtue-Of Relation.Paul Audi - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (12):685-711.

View all 21 references / Add more references