Accountability and values in radically collaborative research

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46:16-23 (2014)
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Abstract

This paper discusses a crisis of accountability that arises when scientific collaborations are massively epistemically distributed. We argue that social models of epistemic collaboration, which are social analogs to what Patrick Suppes called a “model of the experiment,” must play a role in creating accountability in these contexts. We also argue that these social models must accommodate the fact that the various agents in a collaborative project often have ineliminable, messy, and conflicting interests and values; any story about accountability in a massively distributed collaboration must therefore involve models of such interests and values and their methodological and epistemic effects

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2014-01-27

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Author Profiles

Bryce Huebner
Georgetown University
Eric Winsberg
University of South Florida
Quill Rebecca Kukla
Georgetown University

References found in this work

Inductive risk and values in science.Heather Douglas - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.Richard Rudner - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.
Bias and values in scientific research.Torsten Wilholt - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (1):92-101.
Values and Uncertainties in the Predictions of Global Climate Models.Eric Winsberg - 2012 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 22 (2):111-137.

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